Type one emergence is likely to produce a deeper change curve than type two emergence. The change curve is likely to be deeper if: (1) the concept of emergence (and newness that it produces) is not understood or anticipated, (2) the emergence impacts broadly in the system and (3) the emergence is not accompanied by significant training, education and potentiality of changes. We often find not only that productivity and morale drop with the introduction of emergent newness, but also that the drop is energized by the “surprising” impact of the change. Even if it is a positive surprise (as in the case of the broken windows initiative) adjustments that are suddenly needed can be quite stressful.
Clearly, the change curve that is produced by emergence must be carefully managed—though broad-based recognition of the complexity involved in any major change project and through the formulation of realistic expectations regarding the length of time needed for the change to “take hold”, clearly defined criteria and timelines for evaluation of the change, and devotion of sufficient resources to the training and education required for the change to be effectively engaged (Bergquist, 2014).
Conclusions
Covid has revealed the need for us leaders to learn to navigate VUCA-Plus and reshaping of our CAS over time. That means we have to learn how Attractors are built and impact things—sometimes predictably, sometimes not. About 15 years ago, one of us [JF] was struggling with “Sacred Cows” at his previous job. My conclusion there was that our Sacred Cows were “frozen dilemmas” that had been oversimplified by prior leaders into Right/Wrong declarations. They became “sacred cows” because no one knew where they came from, but everyone knew if you crossed into that zone, you’d get pummeled by the institutional bullies who see their cause as maintaining Sacred Cows.
