An aggregation of creeping crises can erode public trust in institutions. According to Boin et al.’s (2020) interpretation, public trust declines when public authorities fail to perform their obligations and develop solutions that protect the public from the threat of a creeping crisis. The authors do, however, state that in the current situation, public authorities are unable to effectively deal with threats such as Covid-19 because politicians are dependent on experts and advisors and lack the relevant conceptual framework and systemic understanding required for decision making in relevant fields. Furthermore, politicians are oriented to the short term and are not oriented to resolving deep problems that require long-term planning and preparations. I believe that it is difficult to accept this explanation because the Covid-19 pandemic, even if it is a persistent creeping crisis, and even if its effects are the outcome of long-term neglect, governments are nonetheless required to devise urgent solutions in the short term. Whatever the root cause, it is clear that public trust in Israel has clearly declined as a result of authorities’ inadequate handling of the pandemic and its social and economic implications.
The Political Situation in Israel
Maor, Sulitzeanu-Kenan, and Chinitz, (2020) have recently argued that Prime Minister Netanyahu deliberately employed disproportionate policy responses to the Covid-19 crisis, or what is known as an overreaction rhetoric style of communication. They emphasized that Netanyahu seized the ‘creeping crisis’ (Boin et al., 2020) to continually step up existential warnings to the public, by envisaging a plague of medieval proportions. Netanyahu combined this rhetoric with an appeal to his opposition rival Benny Gantz, to join him in an “emergency unity government” to help save Israel from the virus. The Israeli government successfully curbed the spread of the first wave of the virus through a combination of governmental steps implemented in the early stages of Covid-19 spread in Israel, which included stringent social distancing measures, complete closure of the education system, cessation of passenger flights to Israel, strict curfews and lockdowns, and an almost complete shut-down of the economy.
At the time, in late January 2020, the Israeli government was experiencing a constitutional crisis that was exacerbated by a year-long electoral impasse: Following two consecutive elections held prior to the pandemic, and a third that was held immediately after its initial outbreak, the government – comprising right-wing and ultra-Orthodox religious parties – fell short of winning the majority required to form a new coalition government. This unprecedented string of inconclusive elections occurred amidst the growing global and local anxiety regarding the spread of the coronavirus, and resulted in great public uncertainty. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the head of Israel’s provisional government, Benjamin Netanyahu, was scheduled to appear in court on March 17, 2020, to face charges of fraud, bribery, and breach of trust.
Thus, the conditions were ripe for an intermingling of political considerations in defining policy problems, as well as in the selection of policy measures in the fight against Covid-19. Although Israel has faced serious emergency management challenges in the past, especially during wars and major terrorist attacks, its healthcare system was unprepared for an epidemic. The State Audit Report published on March 23, 2020 concluded that the healthcare system including and country’s hospitals were inadequately prepared for a pandemic flu outbreak despite a 2005 government decision on the need for preparedness. The report also highlighted the shortage of hospital beds, isolation rooms, staffing, and medications, in addition to ill-equipped intensive care units and a lack of cooperation between the MoH and the Ministry of Defense (Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, 2020, p. 518).
