Did Louis Breger act ethically in terms of his treatment of Yael? Does this ethical behavior stand up to the ethical criteria determined by Freud? (He himself was said to be very personable, warm, with his patients) Does the fear of non-ethical relations even cross Breger’s mind? Would questions such as these even come up? Had I not been trained as a therapist who is under threat that any ethical deviation is some sort of exploitation?
Mitchell (p.167) repeatedly states that engagement between the patient and the intersubjective analyst is more and more being perceived as an agent for deep change. Those relationships that are studied include the relationship between the therapist and patient. The strong feelings that emerge from the therapeutic process become most significant in the analytic understanding of transference and counter-transference. Mitchell underlines the point that neutrality restraint encompasses all; anonymity and abstinence are among the hallmarks of classical analytic therapy. These are basically negative principle .I would say that they are not negative in the therapeutic sense, but by definition. They describe what not to do where there is doubt. He claims that it implemented like this: “Do not answer, do not talk, do not express yourself, and do not expose yourself. Quiet and shallow emotions are allowed for a sort of release”(p.167)
Mitchell adds that these changes opened up the possibility for the analysts to be more honest with themselves and with others, in terms of what really happened. According to Mitchell, the analyst “is no longer a screen”. The feelings of the analyst, including self-exposure, are invariably a part of the process. The criticism about this approach is the fear of abandonment in principle and a disregard for the classic approach, which is more conservative. I believe that the classic approach should not be rejected as irrelevant and that personal disclosure can be a slippery slope without any stop signs or warning signals. It is understandable that this creates a sense of danger for the classic therapist. The breaking down of borders can be seen by the relativist and the intersubjectives as necessary, liberating and empowering. And who can determine that this is not so? Is it really the road upon which you will travel and from which the relativist and intersubjective must deviate?
As an analyst, Louis Breger agrees to go on a journey in which he is not protected from the topics and processes that are about to occur. Yet one thing seems to have been clear to him–the attachment. His patient is clearly in need of a healing “Attachment wounds” means that therapeutic space should be based on the relationship between him and his patient. Is the therapeutic relationship between himself and his patient Yael without boundaries? Is it without ethical rules of what is allowed and what is forbidden?
Mitchell (2000) mentions the “everything goes” feeling that can result from such attitudes as everything is permissible. He writes honestly, saying that relational analysts might come off as wild therapists who do and say whatever comes into their head without inhibition. In opposing this superficial point of view, Mitchell clearly recommends that relativist therapists tend toward caution, reason and restraint – and especially towards meticulous self-observation. Along with that, Mitchell vehemently opposes those therapists who adhere to “over-authenticity” which requires them to say it all. How does one create both expressivity and restraint? This is the sort of thought process that intersubjectives and relativists must learn to develop.
