As Christakis (2020, p. 11) notes, a “social nuclear” weapon was engaged in China and emulated by other countries—though often with some variants. For instance, a “softer” and more humanitarian approach was taken in New Zealand that made implementation of this policy more palatable. A culture of compliance in Singapore and China made implementation more feasible. The small size of Singapore also made implementation somewhat easier, while in China the NPI policy was implemented and enforced at all levels of government (Christakis, 2020, p. 10).
The rate of infection was soon creeping back up in each of these countries—especially among members of their communities who are marginalized. Requirements regarding lock down were eased at times. Citizens were spending more time out in public. They were social distancing, but this was not enough. The NPI restrictions were often re-instituted as infections and deaths once again rose. COVID-19 infections would come and go—much as was predicted by many advocates of herd immunization. Restrictions also came and went—with citizens uncertain about what to do. This uncertainly, in turn, increased levels of anxiety—and this increased anxiety produced stress, which made citizens more vulnerable to many diseases (not just COZVID-19). Christakis (2020, p. 143) identifies this as Psychogenetic Illness and offers the following disturbing description:
Fear can itself be contagious, forming a kind of parallel epidemic. Contagions of germs, emotions, and behaviors can act independently or they can intersect [as is the case with all complex systems]. And fear has an advantage over even the most contagious pathogens—people can contract a disease only through contact with other infested individuals, but they can contract feat through contact with either infected individuals or fearful ones.
It is when fear is introduced into the drama of 2020 COVD-19 that we find not just psychogenetic illness, but also the inability for citizens of a nation to make slow, thoughtful decisions.
