“Within the cabinet as well as on Capitol Hill, the rancor over slavery infected every discourse. The debates had grown ‘so bitter, according to Seward, that personal and even official relationships among members were ruptured, leading to ‘a prolonged discontinuance of Cabinet meetings.’ Though Tuesdays and Fridays were still designated for sessions, each secretary remained in his department unless a messenger arrived to confirm that a meeting would be held. Seward recalled that when these general discussions were still taking place, Lincoln had listened intently but had not taken ‘an active part in them.’ For Lincoln, the problem of slavery was not an abstract issue. While he concurred with the most passionate abolitionists that slavery was ‘a moral, a social and a political wrong,’ as president, he could not ignore the constitutional protection of the institution where it already existed.”
There was no occasion during Lincoln’s presidency when VUCA-Plus was more evident than during this divisive deliberation regarding slavery.
In the midst of this state of bitter disagreement among cabinet members, Lincoln himself had come to a decision regarding slavery that diverged from his previous position (evidence of Lincoln’s openness to divergent perspectives) yet was based values that centered Lincoln’s ultimate decision (Kearns Goodwin, 2005, p. 363):
“Lincoln revealed his preliminary thinking to Seward and Welles in the early hours of Sunday, July 13, as they rode together in the president’s carriage to the funeral of Stanton’s infant son. . . . During the journey . . .the president informed them that he was considering ’emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the Rebels did not cease to persist in their war.’ He said that he had ‘dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and delicacy’ of the subject and had ‘come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued.’ Thus, the constitutional protection of slavery could and would be overridden by the constitutionally sanctioned war powers of the president.
This was, Welles clearly recognized, ‘a new departure for the President, for until this time, in all our previous interviews … he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the General Government with the subject.’ The normally talkative Seward said merely that the ‘subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to bestow on it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer,” though he was inclined to think it “justifiable.'”
The stage was now set for Lincoln to bring his decision regarding emancipation to his conflict-ridden cabinet (Kearns Goodwin, 2005, pp. 463-464)
“[An historical] session was likely held in Lincoln’s office, as depicted in Francis Carpenter’s famous painting, First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation. . . . Lincoln took the floor and announced he had called them together in order to read the preliminary draft of an emancipation proclamation. He understood the “differences in the Cabinet on the slavery question” and welcomed their suggestions after they heard what he had to say; but he wanted them to know that he “had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice.” Then, removing two foolscap sheets from his pocket and adjusting his glasses on his nose, he began to read what amounted to a legal brief for emancipation based on the chief executive’s powers as commander in chief. His draft proclamation set January 1, 1863, little more than five months away, as the date on which all slaves within states still in rebellion against the Union would be declared free, “thenceforward, and forever.” It required no cumbersome enforcement proceedings.”
